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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the National Labor Relations Act was being violated in order for a
district court to acquire jurisdiction. Now, all that the complainant
must show is that he is being deprived of a right under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and that there are no other remedies available
to enforce that right.
JoN A. LUNDIN
Notice of Unpublished Rules. In the recent case of United States
v. A arons,1 the failure of the Coast Guard to publish one of its sub-
stantive rules in the Federal Register was held not to bar conviction for
violation of the rule where the defendants had actual knowledge of the
contents of the rule violated. In so holding the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit refused to follow the Ninth Circuit decision to the
contrary in Hotch v. United States.'
The defendants in the Aarons case were members of a group called
the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), which was conducting
demonstrations against the Navy's Polaris program at the Electric
Boat Company's plant in New London, Connecticut. In response to a
request from the Navy, the Commander of the Third Coast Guard
District issued a "Special Notice" by which he closed a section of the
Thames River directly in front of the Company's property to all per-
sons and vessels between specified hours. The purpose of the closure
was to afford a clear area for the launching of the nuclear submarine
Ethan Allen. The "notice" was published in the Local Notice to
Mariners, and a copy was sent by registered mail to the CNVA which
acknowledged it. It was not, however, published in the Federal
Register.'
On the date of the launching the defendants attempted to enter the
restricted area in two boats and to obstruct the launching. They were
intercepted and shown a copy of the order closing the area. Neverthe-
less they continued into the area and were apprehended and taken into
custody by the Coast Guard.
After trial and conviction for violation of the rule,4 defendants
appealed, contending (among other things) that the "Special Notice"
was invalid because it had not been published in the Federal Register
1310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
2 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
3 United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 343 (2d Cir. 1962).
4 Defendants were convicted under 50 U.S.C. § 192 (1958) of a knowing violation
of an order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
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as required by the Federal Register Act (FRA) 5 and the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA).' The court found that both the FRA and
the APA required publication.7 However, it did not agree with appel-
lants' contention that failure to meet the requirements of these acts
invalidated the regulation. Instead, the court affirmed the conviction,
finding that failure to file or publish as required by the FRA and the
APA was of no consequence as against a person having actual know-
ledge of the contents of the rule.8
In the Hotclz case, which the court in Aarons refused to follow, the
defendant was convicted of violating a regulation of the Department
of the Interior which extended the closed period for commercial fishing.
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.' Upon petition for rehearing the conviction was reversed and
the regulation held invalid because it had not been published in the
Federal Register. 0 On a subsequent petition for rehearing by the
United States the decision was affirmed,1 the court saying that the
regulation was invalid whether or not Hotch had actual notice of it.
In light of the problem raised by the Aarons case the broad language
used by the Hotc court is unfortunate, but the court's decision itself
may be defended. The court in the Hotcl case purported to find the
rule invalid upon the strength of FRA § 5 (a),12 and APA § 3 (a) (3)
& § 4 (a)."
APA § 4(a) sets out the procedure for rule making.' Unless an
6 44 U.S.C. § 305 (1958).
85 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (3) (1958).
7 The court's conclusion in the Aarons case that the "Special Notice" issued by the
Coast Guard was unquestionably a "rule' as defined by the APA § 2 (a), would seem
to be subject to some criticism. It is true there is little doubt that the "notice" comes
within the literal wording of 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1946) defining a rule as "the whole
or any part of any agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect. . . ." Not so clear however is just how literally these words should be taken.
As Professor Davis has noted, the literal meaning of the section would seem to in-
clude "almost every process except licensing. . . ." See 1 DAvis, ADMINIsmATrvE
LAW 295 (1958). He suggests that the APA definition has not changed the meaning
of the term as it existed prior to the act. Id. at 296. To attempt to draw together and
analyse the factors which have led the courts to conclude that an agency has promul-
gated a rule goes beyond the scope of this note. The practitioner should be aware that
a definitional problem does exist and can have a significant effect upon the outcome
of a particular case. See, e.g., the Aarons and Hotcl cases. See generally DAvis,
op. cit. supra, ch. 5 & 6.8 United States v.'Aarons, 310 F2d 341, 348 (2d Cir. 1962).0 Hotch v. United States, 208 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1953).
10 Id. at 249.
U Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954), Note, 68 HA.tv. L. Rxv. 535.
1244 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1958).
135 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a) (3), 1003(a) (1958).
14 The title of APA § 4(a) is "Rule making" and the general headings of the sub-
sections include (a) ".Notice; publication and contents," (b) "Procedures," (c) "Time
of publication or service or rules" and (d) "Petitions."
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agency is exempted from this section, it must follow the designated
procedure in order to promulgate a valid rule. One of the require-
ments is that, "general notice of proposed rule making shall be pub-
lished in the Federal Register (unless all persons subject thereto are
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice
thereof in accordance with law) .... 2"'
It appears that an agency's failure to meet this provision would result
in the invalidity of the rule passed and that notice to the person charged
under the rule as finally issued would not meet the requirement of the
section. Other interested parties should be allowed the opportunity to
present their views in order that the agency be fully informed of the
conflicting interests concerned before promulgating a rule. Providing
minimum constructive notice to those parties who may be affected
under the rule as finally issued is not the purpose of the requirement.
Rather, the purpose is to notify the public of the intent to issue a rule
so that the participation of interested parties may be better assured.
The notification is a step in the rule making process and a prerequisite
to the issuance of valid rule.
This line of reasoning is supported by the legislative history noted
by the court in the Hotch opinion:
In the "rule making" (that is, "legislative" function) it [the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act] provides that with certain exceptions agencies
must publish notice and at least permit interested parties to submit
their views in writing for agency consideration before the issuance of
general regulations (sec. 4) [italics ours]. U.S. Code Congressional
Service, 79th Congress, Second Session, 1946, p. 1195, at 1205.16
The foregoing seems to state the position taken by the United States
Customs Court in Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States,17 in which that
court cites Hotch for the principle that "actual notice of a regulation
does not validate it where neither notice nor the proposed regulation
itself was published in the Federal Register."' 8 The holding in Elof
Hansson with regard to publication requirements rests solely on APA
§ 4(a) requiring notice of proposed rule making. 9 Thus the court
makes no decision with regard to the requirement of publication of the
15 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1958).
16 Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1954).
17 178 F. Supp. 922 (1959).
1 Id. at 929.
19 Id. at 931. The case was later overruled on the grounds that the defendant had
waived his right to object to the failure of the agency to comply with the publication
requirement of § 4(a). United States v. Elof Hansson Inc., 296 F.2d 779 (1960) cert.
denied. The court relied on United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33
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rule as finally issued. Had the court in the Hotch case rested its de-
cision on APA § 4(a) alone, the confusion generated by the case might
have been avoided.
The difficulty with the decision in Hotch is that the court also rests
its conclusion of invalidity upon APA § 3(a) (3)20 and FRA § 5.21 In
taking this position, the court appears to be in error. The basis of the
court's conclusion can be found in its treatment of the requirement of
APA § 3(a) (3) as one more step in the rule making process of APA §
4. But the purpose of APA § 3 (a) (3) is not the same as that of the rule
making section. Rather its purpose apparently is to afford minimum
constructive notice of the rule's contents as finally promulgated by the
agency.2 Had the Congress wished to make such publication a further
step in the rule making process it would probably have included the
requirement under APA § 4. Moreover, the wording of the require-
ment seems to presuppose a valid rule and to impose the additional
requirement that the rule be published to provide the requisite con-
structive notice. 3
Nor can the FRA be said to require publication in order that a rule
be valid as to one with knowledge of its contents. FRA § 7 provides:
"No document required under section 305(a) of this title to be pub-
lished... shall be valid as against any person who has not had actual
knowledge thereof until the duplicate originals or certified copies of the
document shall have been filed.... 2 4
The court in the Hotclk case approaches this section along with FRA
(1952) to find that failure to make timely objection at the administrative level was
fatal. Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
20 This provision requires that, "except to the extent that there is involved (1) any
function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter
relating solely to the internal management of an agency-(a) Every agency shall
separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register . . . (3) substantive
rules adopted as authorized by law and statements of general policy or interpretations
formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public...." 5 U.S.C.§ 1002(a) (3) (1958).
21. "There shall be published in the Federal Register . . . (2) such documents or
classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time have general
applicability and legal effect. . . ." 44 U.S.C. § 305 (1958).
22 The legislative history concerning this section seems to indicate that this inter-
pretation is correct. "Section 3(a) provides that there shall be publication in the
Federal Register of the rules of the various agencies of the government. . . . If a
person has actual notice of a rule, he is bound by it. The only purpose of the require-
ment for publication in the Federal Register is to make sure that persons may find
the necessary rules as to organization and procedure if they seek them. It goes without
saying that actual notice is the best of all notices." See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 415 (1945).
23The section requires publication of substantive rules "adopted as authorized by
law. . . ." (Emphasis added.) For the complete content of the section see note 20
supra.
2444 U.S.C. § 307 (1958).
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§ 225 in a highly artificial manner, finding independent requirements of
filing and publication, and stating that FRA § 7 applies only to the
requirement of filing.26 An examination of the sections with a view to
their practical effect shows that FRA § 2 sets out the procedure by
which an agency files and publishes a rule while FRA § 7 establishes
the point in time at which the constructive notice becomes effective.
Until the constructive notice becomes effective, one without actual
knowledge cannot be bound. Since the express purpose is to protect
only those without actual knowledge and then only until the construc-
tive notice becomes operative, it follows that only those without actual
knowledge should be protected if the document is never filed or
published.
The court in the Aarons case takes the position here outlined. With
reference to the FRA, the court notes that its purpose is to "mitigate
the hardship of the principal ignorantia legis neminim excusat .... 128
Failure to meet the publication requirements of the Act is held to have
no consequence with respect to one with knowledge of the contents of
a regulation.
The requirements of APA § 4(a) were not applicable to the Coast
Guard under the facts of the Aarons case.29 Thus the court does not
purport to come to any conclusion as to the effect of failure to meet the
required notice of proposed rule making under that section. The court
notes the absence of any sanction in the APA itself for failure to meet
the requirements of APA § 3(a) (3). The final sentence of APA § 3
(a) stating that "no person shall in any manner be required to resort to
organization or procedure not so published," clearly does not reach
the requirement of publication under APA § 3(a) (3). APA § 3(a)
(3) requires the publication of substantive rules and makes no mention
of "organization or procedure." The court concludes that FRA §§ 5 &
7 already provide a sanction for failure to comply with APA § 3 (a)
(3) and that its decision with regard to those sections controls. 0
The problems which have plagued the courts in their interpretation
of the federal APA are potentially present in state administrative pro-
2544 U.S.C. § 302 (1958).
26 Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280, 283 (1954).
27 Notice becomes effective upon the filing of the document. 44 U.S.C. § 307 (1958).
28 United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 346 (2d Cir. 1962).
29 The court stated in a footnote: "We are not here dealing with a case where the
rule-making procedures prescribed by § 4 of the APA have not been followed, as to
which, in some instances, different considerations may apply; the Special Notice was
within the exception to § 4 for any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the
United States." 310 F.2d at 348, n. 4.
30 Id. at 348.
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cedure acts. The Model APA3' requires that an agency, before engag-
ing in any rule making function must, "so far as practical, publish or
otherwise circulate notice of its intended action and afford interested
persons opportunity to submit data or views orally or in writing."3
This statement is evidently less definite than its federal counterpart,
but the general intent seems to be the same. The purpose of this section
has been described as follows: "first, to give the agency the enlighten-
ment that interested persons may be able to furnish; and, second, to
give the interested persons the satisfaction of participation in the rule
making process."33
The Washington Act34 requires notice to be filed with the Code
Revisor. Further publication is also required.3 The content of the
notice requirement is taken from its federal counterpart. The purpose
attributable to the Model Act provisions, requiring notice of proposed
rule making, seems to apply equally to the provisions of the Washing-
ton Act.
Neither the Model provision nor its Washington counterpart seems
to have received any judical interpretation, but with respect to their
publication provisions, it appears that each requires a fulfilment of the
notice requirement as a prerequisite to the issuance of a valid rule."
Publication of the rule as finally promulgated by the agency is re-
quired by both the Model Act and the Washington Act. The Model
Act provides that rules shall become "effective" upon filing. 8 A later
section provides for publication. 9 The Washington Act is similar but
contains the additional provision that the rule does not become effective
until 30 days after filing.' Neither act makes any provision concerning
the effect of actual knowledge of the contents of a rule before it be-
3 1
.The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 9C Uniform Laws Annot. 174.
The act has apparently been adopted with only minor changes in Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. See 9C Uniform Laws Annot. (Supp.
1960 at 69).
32 Model State APA § 2(3).
33 Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IoWA L. REv. 196,
202 (1947-48).
34 Washington Administrative Procedure Act, Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 234. See
Trautman & Peck, Administrative Procedure Act, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 281 (1959).
sr Washington Administrative Procedure Act, Wash. Sess. Laws, 1959, ch. 234 §
2(3). The act provides that "the adopting agency shall file notice thereof with the
office of the Code Revisor. So far as practical, the adopting agency shall also publish
or otherwise circulate notice. . .
365 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1958).
37 This view is in accord with what seems to be the best interpretation of the
similar provisions of the Federal APA.
38 Model State APA § 3(2).39 Model State APA §4.40Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 234, § 4.
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limitations suggested by the Department in both its regulation and
its arguments. It has established a policy of flexibility (possessing the
earmarks of durability-all nine judges concurred in the opinion),
which will permit the true sufferer to receive remuneration, but still it
specifically refrained from opening the door to undeserving claimants:
This decision is not to be construed as standing for the proposition
that all persons who are laid off, and who are relatively unsuccessful
in their self-employment endeavors, are considered to be unemployed,
or partially unemployed, and entitled to receive the difference between
the amount they make and the benefits to which they otherwise would
have been entitled.' 7
This decision might be criticized for "opening the floodgates of liti-
gation" as each farmer-laborer seeks to discover whether his particular
circumstances will find favor with the supreme court, but this is why
we have courts. Surely this decision will produce more litigation, but
as each case is decided the boundaries will become more certain and
fixed, and in the end we will have a rule that is the product of reason
and policy, and not one that is closely circumscribed by the short-
comings of semantic definitions.
HAYES ELDER
WILLS
Testamentary Capacity-Insane Delusions. In re Meagher's
Estate' apparently establishes a new rule requiring that the contestant
of a will on the ground of insane delusions must show that the delusion,
to produce goods, to make them and to sell at profit sufficient to attract to that in-
dustry the capital of the country. Without purchasers with money in their pockets,
the wheel of that industry cannot keep going. . . . We must anticipate in the future
the building up . . . of a large and steady purchasing power for a large number of
people." Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935). William Green, then president of the CIO, testified to the same
effect. Evaluating the Federal Social Security Act in a speech (An appraisal of the
Federal Social Security Act, Delivered before the Institute of Public Affairs, Uni-
versity of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, evening of July 10, 1936) Winthrop W.
Aldrich, Board Chairman of the Chase National Bank of the City of New York,
commented as follows: "The gains through unemployment insurance are numerous.
Its first effect is to diminish in the mind of the worker the fear of insecurity. He
knows that if he should lose his job he would not immediately face a total loss of
income. There will be at least some income during a few weeks or months while he
is looking for new work. This relief . . . will be an amount that he can count on.
There will be no humiliation in accepting it. . . . It will be an earned right. ...
"There is something to be said, also, for the effect of unemployment insurance on
business. It helps to stabilize the buying power of the workers. . . . [it] helps . . . to
keep buying in its accustomed channels."
17 160 Wash. Dec. at 719, 375 P.2d at 161 (1962).
1 160 Wash. Dec. 691, 375 P.2d 148 (1962).
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